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How Dr. Copan Explains Away Biblical Violence
There has been a shift in conservative biblical apologetics recently that attempts to de-literalize the Bible’s objectionable passages. In the past, conservative biblical apologetics was noted for its defense of the literal meaning of the Bible even when it seemingly endorsed violence or punishments we would call cruel.
Dr. Paul Copan follows this de-literalization campaign by claiming that Deuteronomy 25:11-12 should not be taken literally. He discusses this passage in Is God a Moral Monster? (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2011), 121-122.
He also has comments about the passage here.
Here is what Deuteronomy 25:11-12 says in the Revised Standard Version:
"[11] When men fight with one another, and the wife of the one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of him who is beating him, and puts out her hand and seizes him by the private parts, [12] then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall have no pity.”
Most scholars accept a literal interpretation. For example, Tikva Frymer-Kensky stated the following on p. 1033 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (2 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), which Dr. Matt Flannagan had cited before:
“The penalty for injury is talionic retribution (Lev.24:19-20). The exception is the woman who protects her brawling husband by grabbing the other man’s testicles with force...Her hand is to be cut off (Deut. 25:11-12). Intention does not count, even though she tried to save her husband rather than injure the victim.”
But, according to Copan, “cut off her hand” (וְקַצֹּתָ֖ה אֶת־ כַּפָּ֑הּ) really means shaving her pubic hair. As Copan phrases it:
“At first blush, this passage apparently requires that a woman’s hand be cut off if she seizes the genitals of a man fighting with her husband. Now if this were the case, it would be the only biblical instance of punishment by mutilation; beyond this, where ancient Near Eastern laws call for bodily mutilation for various offenses, the Mosaic law did not...A more plausible interpretation of the passage is the punishment by depilation (‘you shall shave [the hair of] her groin’), not mutilation.”
For his conclusion, Copan is principally relying on an article written by Jerome T. Walsh, “‘You shall Cut off her...Palm?’ A Reexamination of Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” Journal of Semitic Studies 49, no. 1 (2004):47-58.
In this essay, I will first critique, in Part I, Dr. Copan’s main reasons for interpreting that text non-literally. In Part II, I will give my reasons for accepting a literal interpretation of that text.
PART I: COPAN’S REASONS
So, let’s go through the main reasons given by Copan and evaluate each one, which are given in my own order rather than the order in which they might appear in the work of Copan (or Walsh).
REASON 1: “The word commonly translated ‘hand’ (kaph) can refer to the ‘palm’ of the hand or some rounded concave object like a dish or a bowl, or spoon, or even the arch of a foot. The commonly used word for ‘hand’ (yad) isn’t used here. It would be strange to cut off the palm of a hand!” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 121).
While it is true that Hebrew YAD is the normal word for hand, we also know that KAPH could mean the same thing. For example, D. J. A. Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (4.450), defines KAPH as follows, referring specifically to Deuteronomy 25:12: “1a. usu[ally] hand, palm (entire hand in e.g., Dt 25:12...”
Walsh also acknowledges this: “[kaph] is used interchangeably with [yad]” (“A Reexamination," p. 53).
Minimizing the fact that KAPH could mean the entire hand, and then giving the impression that it is a problem not to include the regular word for hand, is what leads Copan to manufacture a problem of saying that the “palm of her hand,” not the whole hand, was cut off.
There are plenty of other cases where KAPH does not refer just to the palm of a hand, but the whole hand: For example, note Psalm 63:4 (verse 5 in Hebrew): “So I will bless thee as long as I live; I will lift up my hands [KAPHAY] and call on thy name.”
Note Hebrew: כֵּ֣ן אֲבָרֶכְךָ֣ בְחַיָּ֑י בְּ֝שִׁמְךָ אֶשָּׂ֥א כַפָּֽי׃
The words “hands” here renders the plural (or dual) of Hebrew KAPH. If we accepted Copan’s pseudo-problem, then this text might be saying that ONLY THE PALMS of the hand were lifted, and not the whole hands. This would be anatomically absurd.
Obviously KAPH means the whole hand is lifted, not just the palm. Thus, there is no problem in saying KAPH in Deuteronomy 25:12 simply means the whole hand, not just the palm of her hand. Copan is manufacturing a problem that needs no solution.
We also should clarify that YAD, the regular Hebrew word for hand, in Hebrew IS USED in Deut. 25:11. Accordingly some may wonder why this was not just repeated in verse 12.
The best explanation is that this is an instance of the well-known phenomenon in ancient Hebrew of word-pairs—closely related words that are used together in Hebrew expressions. For example, “hands" can be coupled with “fingers” to form such a word-pair.
A. “Isaiah 2:8: Their land is filled with idols;
they bow down to the work of their hands,to what their own fingers have made.”
B. Isaiah 17:8: “they will not have regard for the altars, the work of their hands,
and they will not look to what their own fingers have made, either the Ashe'rim or the altars of incense.”
While such coupled words are normally found in poetry, there is no logical reason that legal materials cannot employ such coupled words. In Deuteronomy 25:11-12, we may have a similar phenomenon with the words YAD and KAPH being coupled.
REASON 2: “Furthermore, in certain places in the Old Testament the word kaph is clearly used for the pelvic area—either the concave hip socket (Gen. 32:26, 32) or the curve of the woman’s groin area: ‘I arose to open for my lover, and my hands dripped with myrrh, my fingers with flowing myrrh, on the handles [plural: kaphot] of the lock’ (Song of Songs 5:5 NIV). This language alludes back to the ‘locked garden’ in 4:12: ‘You are a locked garden, my sister, my bride, you are an enclosed spring, a sealed-up fountain’ (NET). Scholars generally agree that the garden language is a metaphor for a woman’s sexual organs, and its being ‘locked’ implies her purity/virginity” (Is God a Moral Monster? p. 121)
Here, Copan, is simply relying on Walsh, with no critical evaluation of the evidence that Walsh presents. The fact is that things are not clear at all.
There are two biblical passages used by Walsh to argue that KAPH “is used in a sexual context” (“A Reexamination,” p. 54):
A. Genesis 32:25, 32 (verses 26 and 33 in Hebrew)
B. Song of Songs 5:4-5
The instances in Genesis 32:25, 32 are highly disputed and hardly constitute a reason to substitute “hair of the groin” for the more obvious “hand” in Deut. 25:12.
Both of these instances are also grammatically different from that in Deuteronomy 25:12 in that they are in the construct state, meaning that the word KAPH is bound in a possessive expression: “KAPH of his thigh” as opposed to a simple use of KAPH we find in Deuteronomy 25:12. The RSV translates as “hollow of this thigh,” but that would not necessarily mean “pubic/groin.”
In the Song of Songs 5:4-5, the sexual imagery is more apparent, but there is no agreement on what these verses mean. Here is the relevant passage:
[4] My beloved put his hand to the latch,
and my heart was thrilled within me.
[5] I arose to open to my beloved,
and my hands dripped with myrrh,
my fingers with liquid myrrh,
upon the handles [KAPHOT] of the bolt.
Again, we have a construct expression (“KAPHOT of the bolt”) and so it is not the same as a simple KAPH. Second, there is no reason that KAPHOT has to refer to the groin area just because the rest of the context is erotic or speaks of a locked garden. It is perfectly reasonable, in such an erotic context, to understand that she was opening the door for her lover instead of understanding that the liquid myrrh referred to vaginal secretions or the like.
As Marvin Pope notes in his commentary (Song of Songs, [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977] p. 522), we do have erotic poetry in which anointing the door jambs are mentioned. Here is an example from Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (4.1175-79; 1st c. BCE; Loeb Classical Series):
“But the lover shut out, weeping, often covers, the threshold with flowers and wreaths, anoints the proud doorpost with oil of marjoram.”
There are other examples of anointing doors with oil in the Near East and so there is no reason to think that Song 5:4-5 is speaking of the groin here.
REASON 3: “Also in the Deuteronomy 25 text, there is no indication of physical harm to the man (as some commentators commonly assume). For those who assume a literal ‘hand for hand’ punishment, remember that the man’s hand hasn’t been injured or cut off (if so, then the idea of cutting off her hand would make slightly more sense)” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 122).
The lack of physical harm to the man is not sufficient reason to deny that the text referred to a literal hand severing. A punishment may differ according to the status of the offender and the person offended. Thus, a son need only be rebellious, not necessarily cause physical harm, in order to be stoned to death in Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
[18] "If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son, who will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and, though they chastise him, will not give heed to them, [19] then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his city at the gate of the place where he lives, [20] and they shall say to the elders of his city, `This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard.' [21] Then all the men of the city shall stone him to death with stones; so you shall purge the evil from your midst; and all Israel shall hear, and fear.
REASON 4: “In addition, shaving her hair—including pubic hair—as a humiliating punishment was practiced in Babylon and Sumer...”
This is irrelevant because it is cancelled out by the fact that cutting off limbs was also practiced in Mesopotamian cultures. So, why not appeal to those parallels instead? Below we discuss how arbitrarily he dismisses the closest Mesopotamian parallel to Deuteronomy 25.
REASON 5: “In addition, the specific Hebrew qal verb form (in Deut. 25:12) has a milder connotation than the stronger, intensified piel verb form, meaning ‘cut off’ or ‘(physically sever (qatsats).’ Whenever it appears in this milder form (Jer. 9:26, 25:23, 49:32), it means ‘clip/cut/shave [hair].’ There’s just no linguistic reason to translate the weaker verb form (“shave”) as a stronger form (i.e., amputation)” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 122).
Copan seems very confused about the meaning of the so-called piel and qal verb forms in Hebrew. He uses words like “milder” for the qal form and “stronger” for the piel form as though those forms necessarily are meant to express differential levels of severity or brutality.
However, one main difference in the qal and piel of the verb QATSATS is not brutality but plurality. That is to say the qal is found primarily with singular objects, while the piel is most often found with plural objects or where objects are cut into many pieces.
This could be an instance of what is called the “frequentative” use of the piel in Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), pp. 414-415, where it is stated that “the Piel reflects a multiplicity of actions or objects.”
In the examples Copan cites (Jeremiah 9:26, 25:23, and 49:32) all the objects of the qal passive participle (nominal form) of QATSATS are grammatically SINGULAR, and may be literally translated “ones cut of forehead” as in Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew. The qal is fine there.
And if you cut off ONE hand, then the qal is perfectly fine. Note that Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew includes “cut off, cut away” for the qal meaning, and mentions Deuteronomy 25:12 specifically.
Consider another verb, KARAT, meaning “to cut.” It is used in the qal form when clear cutting of the flesh is indicated by circumcision in Exodus 4:25: “Then Zippo'rah took a flint and cut off [qal form of KARAT] her son's foreskin, and touched Moses’ feet with it, and said, ‘Surely you are a bridegroom of blood to me!’” ---Note Hebrew וַתִּכְרֹת֙ אֶת־ עָרְלַ֣ת בְּנָ֔הּ.
So there is nothing linguistically that prevents a qal verbal form from expressing a brutal action like cutting a hand in Deuteronomy 25:12.
REASON 6: “In this particular case, we’re talking about the open concave region of the groin, and thus a shaving of pubic hair. In short, the woman’s punishment is public humiliation for publicly humiliating a man.”
This is a manufactured inference because Copan has not shown that KAPH means the groin region (see Reason 2). Copan makes much of the fact that KAPH can carry the idea of concave features, which would apply to the groin. However, the same may be said of the palms of the hand, and so that ends up being no reason to dismiss the plain meaning of Deut. 25:12.
PART II: REASONS FOR A LITERAL UNDERSTANDING
In attempting to understand what words meant in an ancient culture, I usually begin with these sources:
A. Translations of those words by Hebrew speakers closest to the time of the earliest biblical texts, though caution must also be applied, of course;
B. Comparative Examples;
C. Context.
Applying these methods, they all lead to the conclusion that a literal understanding is the most reasonable.
A. TRANSLATIONS
First, Copan completely ignored the Septuagint, the complex of Greek translations made by those who understood Hebrew in the pre-Christian era. They understood Deut. 25:11-12 to mean “cut off her hand” not shaving of the groin. Note the passage:
11 ἐὰν δὲ μάχωνται ἄνθρωποι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό ἄνθρωπος μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ προσέλθῃ γυνὴ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς ἐκ χειρὸς τοῦ τύπτοντος αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα ἐπιλάβηται τῶν διδύμων αὐτοῦ 12 ἀποκόψεις τὴν χεῖρα αὐτῆς οὐ φείσεται ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἐπ' αὐτῇ
Note that the passage translates KAPH with the Greek CHEIRA (χεῖρα), which is the normal word for hand. It uses ἀποκόψεις, a form of APOKOPTO, which is not normally used for cutting pubic hair, but is used for chopping and mutilating. Liddell and Scott (Greek-English Lexicon, p. 100), render it “to cut off, hew off, of men’s limbs.”
There is no indication of shaving hair or groin areas, for which there were different Greek words.
The Aramaic translators of Deuteronomy 25:12 use the words “ydh” (“her hand”) and so also understand that a hand is being cut, not hair on a groin.
See: A. Sperber, The Bible in Aramaic according to the Targum Onkelos (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), vol. 1, p. 332.
B. COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES
Comparisons are important in legal materials because we have close verbal or situational parallels to the Bible in Near Eastern law codes.
We have a very close parallel, even by Copan’s admission, in the Middle Assyrian Laws A 8 (aka MAL A 8). Here is the passage (Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997] pp. 156-7):
“If a woman should crush a man’s testicle during a quarrel, they shall cut off one of her fingers...or if she should crush the second testicle during the quarrel—they shall gouge out both her [...]-s.”
Presumably, the end of the incomplete text can be reconstructed as “they shall gouge out both her eyes.”
Since both Matthew Flannagan and Copan have appealed before to Raymond Westbrook for supposed support perhaps they should also acknowledge what the latter says about Deuteronomy 25:12 in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel (p. 80):
“Deuteronomy 25:11-12 punishes a woman who seizes a man’s genitals with the loss of her hand, even though it was done to defend her husband in a fight. It is not stated whether she caused the injury or not. The law evidently derives from a case also found in MAL A 8, where the injury inflicted is the main issue.”
Copan says that this Middle Assyrian law “presents a similar scenario (in the case of injury to the man)...” to that of Deuteronomy 25. But for Copan, Deuteronomy 25, still stands “out in marked contrast to the severe and excessive mutilation punishments common in the Near East” (Is God A Moral Monster? p. 122).
At once, one sees Copan’s double standards in both moral evaluation and interpretation. One could just as easily use similar linguistic gymnastics to argue that the woman of the Middle Assyrian Laws only suffered a shaved groin.
But he evaluates Middle Assyrian laws as more brutal only because he takes them literally. On the other hand, he evaluates Deuteronomy 25 as less brutal because he takes similar words and scenarios non-literally.
Notice also that his Reason 4 used the existence of a shaving ritual in Mesopotamia to support his interpretation of Deuteronomy 25, but he won’t use a closer Middle Assyrian law to explain Deuteronomy 25.
Yet, as Westbrook notes, one can see that Deuteronomy 25 is simply a variant of that Middle Assyrian Laws. Specifically both laws:
A. Have a woman, who
B. helps her husband in a quarrel with another man
C. by injuring or seizing the testicles of her husband’s opponent,
D. and the penalty for which is mutilation of all or part of her hand.
Thus, it is unreasonable to go to texts in which the meaning of KAPH may or may not be the groin, or the hollow of the thigh, etc. when there is a text with much closer situational and legal expressions.
A good old fashioned rule in hermeneutics is to explain the more obscure text by the clearer text. The Middle Assyrian laws are much clearer in their legal parallel to Deut. 25 than Genesis 32 or Songs 5.
C. CONTEXT
Repeatedly, both Copan and Walsh tell us that one reason for a non-literal interpretation is to resolve the seeming brutality of the law in Deuteronomy 25. Jerome T. Walsh, says that his non-literal understanding “resolves the anomaly of one and only one law in the entire Israelite corpus that imposes physical mutilation as a punishment” (A Reexamination,” p. 47).
Copan says:
“Again even if Deuteronomy were dealing with an actual mutilation punishment, this would be (1) the only such mutilation punishment in the Mosaic Law and (2) a dramatic contrast to the frequent mutilation punishments in the rest of the ancient Near East.”
The first problem is philosophical. There seems to be a premise that a law that occurs only once cannot be meant literally or needs to be explained alternatively. The problem is that this is not being done consistently. There are many laws stated only once or which may have something unique, and I see no similar efforts to explain them non-literally.
For example, the only one of the Ten Commandments to have a promise is the one about honoring father and mother (Exodus 20:12). So would that mean that we should try to explain that commandment non-literally because it has some unique feature (cf. Ephesians 6:2)?
Furthermore if eliminating the only instance of X is the motive, then they only created another problem—A unique instance of Y. That is to say, Copan and Walsh now created the only instance where the verb QATSATS + the noun KAPH = “shaving pubic hair” in the Bible. Thus, they are just substituting one unique feature for another.
The second problem is that it is not quite true that Deut. 25:11-12 would be the ONLY mutilation punishment in the Mosaic Law. For that to be true, we would have to not count all the “eye-for-eye” laws in Leviticus 24:17-22 as not consisting of “mutilation.” Stoning, burning, hacking are all methods of punishing found in Pentateuchal laws and narratives, and so why should cutting off a hand be so different?
We also know that mutilation was routinely used, without censure from the narrators, in many instances. For example:
2 Samuel 4:12: “And David commanded his young men, and they killed them, and cut off their hands and feet, and hanged them beside the pool at Hebron.”
Judges 1:5-7: “They came upon Ado'ni-be'zek at Bezek, and fought against him, and defeated the Canaanites and the Per'izzites. Ado'ni-be'zek fled; but they pursued him, and caught him, and cut off his thumbs and his great toes. And Ado'ni-be'zek said, ‘Seventy kings with their thumbs and their great toes cut off used to pick up scraps under my table; as I have done, so God has requited me.’ And they brought him to Jerusalem, and he died there.”
There seems to have been no compunction about mutilating people who are perceived as offensive, and so why should Deuteronomy 25 be different?
CONCLUSION
It is easy to see why the vast majority of scholars have rejected Copan’s reading of Deuteronomy 25. That in itself does not make Copan wrong.
But since he and Matt Flannagan have appealed to Raymond Westbrook and A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, it should be reiterated that both sources specifically reject Copan’s view of Deuteronomy 25:11-12.
Copan’s view of Deuteronomy 25 is wrong because it is clearly intended to whitewash biblical brutality on the basis of the flimsiest of comparative legal and linguistic evidence and because it relies on exegetical maneuvers that could be used to explain away brutality in other Near Eastern texts Copan says are worse.
It is philosophically flawed because it is premised on the idea that uniqueness should be explained non-literally, and because it is not really unique in the first place in terms of a cultural context where bodily mutilation was practiced by the most beloved and heroic of their figures.
QUESTIONS FOR DR. COPAN
In case Dr. Copan wishes to respond, here are a few questions for him:
A. Why did you ignore the evidence of the Septuagint in your attempt to understand the meaning of Deut. 25:11-12?
B. Can you show us another clear instance where QATSATS + KAPH means “shaving pubic hair”?
C. Do you regard uniqueness of law as a reason to interpret it non-literally?
D.Where else do you find the expression "your eye shall not have pity" when someone endures punitive shaving?
E. Would you accept non-literal interpretations of the Near Eastern texts you regard as more brutal than the Bible?
NOTE: All translation are from the Revised Standard Version unless noted otherwise.
FURTHER READING:
Raymond Westbrook and Bruce Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2009).
Marc Cortez, “The Law of Violent Intervention: Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” Revisited,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 30, no. 3 (2006):431-447. Dr. Copan hastily dismisses this article.
Saul Olyan, “What do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts?” Journal of Biblical Literature 117, no. 4 (1998):611-622.
Walsh cites Olyan, but Olyan does not include Deut. 25:12 as an instance of shaving, ritual or otherwise.
There has been a shift in conservative biblical apologetics recently that attempts to de-literalize the Bible’s objectionable passages. In the past, conservative biblical apologetics was noted for its defense of the literal meaning of the Bible even when it seemingly endorsed violence or punishments we would call cruel.
Dr. Paul Copan follows this de-literalization campaign by claiming that Deuteronomy 25:11-12 should not be taken literally. He discusses this passage in Is God a Moral Monster? (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2011), 121-122.
He also has comments about the passage here.
Here is what Deuteronomy 25:11-12 says in the Revised Standard Version:
"[11] When men fight with one another, and the wife of the one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of him who is beating him, and puts out her hand and seizes him by the private parts, [12] then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall have no pity.”
Most scholars accept a literal interpretation. For example, Tikva Frymer-Kensky stated the following on p. 1033 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (2 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003), which Dr. Matt Flannagan had cited before:
“The penalty for injury is talionic retribution (Lev.24:19-20). The exception is the woman who protects her brawling husband by grabbing the other man’s testicles with force...Her hand is to be cut off (Deut. 25:11-12). Intention does not count, even though she tried to save her husband rather than injure the victim.”
But, according to Copan, “cut off her hand” (וְקַצֹּתָ֖ה אֶת־ כַּפָּ֑הּ) really means shaving her pubic hair. As Copan phrases it:
“At first blush, this passage apparently requires that a woman’s hand be cut off if she seizes the genitals of a man fighting with her husband. Now if this were the case, it would be the only biblical instance of punishment by mutilation; beyond this, where ancient Near Eastern laws call for bodily mutilation for various offenses, the Mosaic law did not...A more plausible interpretation of the passage is the punishment by depilation (‘you shall shave [the hair of] her groin’), not mutilation.”
For his conclusion, Copan is principally relying on an article written by Jerome T. Walsh, “‘You shall Cut off her...Palm?’ A Reexamination of Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” Journal of Semitic Studies 49, no. 1 (2004):47-58.
In this essay, I will first critique, in Part I, Dr. Copan’s main reasons for interpreting that text non-literally. In Part II, I will give my reasons for accepting a literal interpretation of that text.
PART I: COPAN’S REASONS
So, let’s go through the main reasons given by Copan and evaluate each one, which are given in my own order rather than the order in which they might appear in the work of Copan (or Walsh).
REASON 1: “The word commonly translated ‘hand’ (kaph) can refer to the ‘palm’ of the hand or some rounded concave object like a dish or a bowl, or spoon, or even the arch of a foot. The commonly used word for ‘hand’ (yad) isn’t used here. It would be strange to cut off the palm of a hand!” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 121).
While it is true that Hebrew YAD is the normal word for hand, we also know that KAPH could mean the same thing. For example, D. J. A. Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (4.450), defines KAPH as follows, referring specifically to Deuteronomy 25:12: “1a. usu[ally] hand, palm (entire hand in e.g., Dt 25:12...”
Walsh also acknowledges this: “[kaph] is used interchangeably with [yad]” (“A Reexamination," p. 53).
Minimizing the fact that KAPH could mean the entire hand, and then giving the impression that it is a problem not to include the regular word for hand, is what leads Copan to manufacture a problem of saying that the “palm of her hand,” not the whole hand, was cut off.
There are plenty of other cases where KAPH does not refer just to the palm of a hand, but the whole hand: For example, note Psalm 63:4 (verse 5 in Hebrew): “So I will bless thee as long as I live; I will lift up my hands [KAPHAY] and call on thy name.”
Note Hebrew: כֵּ֣ן אֲבָרֶכְךָ֣ בְחַיָּ֑י בְּ֝שִׁמְךָ אֶשָּׂ֥א כַפָּֽי׃
The words “hands” here renders the plural (or dual) of Hebrew KAPH. If we accepted Copan’s pseudo-problem, then this text might be saying that ONLY THE PALMS of the hand were lifted, and not the whole hands. This would be anatomically absurd.
Obviously KAPH means the whole hand is lifted, not just the palm. Thus, there is no problem in saying KAPH in Deuteronomy 25:12 simply means the whole hand, not just the palm of her hand. Copan is manufacturing a problem that needs no solution.
We also should clarify that YAD, the regular Hebrew word for hand, in Hebrew IS USED in Deut. 25:11. Accordingly some may wonder why this was not just repeated in verse 12.
The best explanation is that this is an instance of the well-known phenomenon in ancient Hebrew of word-pairs—closely related words that are used together in Hebrew expressions. For example, “hands" can be coupled with “fingers” to form such a word-pair.
A. “Isaiah 2:8: Their land is filled with idols;
they bow down to the work of their hands,to what their own fingers have made.”
B. Isaiah 17:8: “they will not have regard for the altars, the work of their hands,
and they will not look to what their own fingers have made, either the Ashe'rim or the altars of incense.”
While such coupled words are normally found in poetry, there is no logical reason that legal materials cannot employ such coupled words. In Deuteronomy 25:11-12, we may have a similar phenomenon with the words YAD and KAPH being coupled.
REASON 2: “Furthermore, in certain places in the Old Testament the word kaph is clearly used for the pelvic area—either the concave hip socket (Gen. 32:26, 32) or the curve of the woman’s groin area: ‘I arose to open for my lover, and my hands dripped with myrrh, my fingers with flowing myrrh, on the handles [plural: kaphot] of the lock’ (Song of Songs 5:5 NIV). This language alludes back to the ‘locked garden’ in 4:12: ‘You are a locked garden, my sister, my bride, you are an enclosed spring, a sealed-up fountain’ (NET). Scholars generally agree that the garden language is a metaphor for a woman’s sexual organs, and its being ‘locked’ implies her purity/virginity” (Is God a Moral Monster? p. 121)
Here, Copan, is simply relying on Walsh, with no critical evaluation of the evidence that Walsh presents. The fact is that things are not clear at all.
There are two biblical passages used by Walsh to argue that KAPH “is used in a sexual context” (“A Reexamination,” p. 54):
A. Genesis 32:25, 32 (verses 26 and 33 in Hebrew)
B. Song of Songs 5:4-5
The instances in Genesis 32:25, 32 are highly disputed and hardly constitute a reason to substitute “hair of the groin” for the more obvious “hand” in Deut. 25:12.
Both of these instances are also grammatically different from that in Deuteronomy 25:12 in that they are in the construct state, meaning that the word KAPH is bound in a possessive expression: “KAPH of his thigh” as opposed to a simple use of KAPH we find in Deuteronomy 25:12. The RSV translates as “hollow of this thigh,” but that would not necessarily mean “pubic/groin.”
In the Song of Songs 5:4-5, the sexual imagery is more apparent, but there is no agreement on what these verses mean. Here is the relevant passage:
[4] My beloved put his hand to the latch,
and my heart was thrilled within me.
[5] I arose to open to my beloved,
and my hands dripped with myrrh,
my fingers with liquid myrrh,
upon the handles [KAPHOT] of the bolt.
Again, we have a construct expression (“KAPHOT of the bolt”) and so it is not the same as a simple KAPH. Second, there is no reason that KAPHOT has to refer to the groin area just because the rest of the context is erotic or speaks of a locked garden. It is perfectly reasonable, in such an erotic context, to understand that she was opening the door for her lover instead of understanding that the liquid myrrh referred to vaginal secretions or the like.
As Marvin Pope notes in his commentary (Song of Songs, [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977] p. 522), we do have erotic poetry in which anointing the door jambs are mentioned. Here is an example from Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura (4.1175-79; 1st c. BCE; Loeb Classical Series):
“But the lover shut out, weeping, often covers, the threshold with flowers and wreaths, anoints the proud doorpost with oil of marjoram.”
There are other examples of anointing doors with oil in the Near East and so there is no reason to think that Song 5:4-5 is speaking of the groin here.
REASON 3: “Also in the Deuteronomy 25 text, there is no indication of physical harm to the man (as some commentators commonly assume). For those who assume a literal ‘hand for hand’ punishment, remember that the man’s hand hasn’t been injured or cut off (if so, then the idea of cutting off her hand would make slightly more sense)” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 122).
The lack of physical harm to the man is not sufficient reason to deny that the text referred to a literal hand severing. A punishment may differ according to the status of the offender and the person offended. Thus, a son need only be rebellious, not necessarily cause physical harm, in order to be stoned to death in Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
[18] "If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son, who will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and, though they chastise him, will not give heed to them, [19] then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his city at the gate of the place where he lives, [20] and they shall say to the elders of his city, `This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard.' [21] Then all the men of the city shall stone him to death with stones; so you shall purge the evil from your midst; and all Israel shall hear, and fear.
REASON 4: “In addition, shaving her hair—including pubic hair—as a humiliating punishment was practiced in Babylon and Sumer...”
This is irrelevant because it is cancelled out by the fact that cutting off limbs was also practiced in Mesopotamian cultures. So, why not appeal to those parallels instead? Below we discuss how arbitrarily he dismisses the closest Mesopotamian parallel to Deuteronomy 25.
REASON 5: “In addition, the specific Hebrew qal verb form (in Deut. 25:12) has a milder connotation than the stronger, intensified piel verb form, meaning ‘cut off’ or ‘(physically sever (qatsats).’ Whenever it appears in this milder form (Jer. 9:26, 25:23, 49:32), it means ‘clip/cut/shave [hair].’ There’s just no linguistic reason to translate the weaker verb form (“shave”) as a stronger form (i.e., amputation)” (Is God a Moral Monster?, p. 122).
Copan seems very confused about the meaning of the so-called piel and qal verb forms in Hebrew. He uses words like “milder” for the qal form and “stronger” for the piel form as though those forms necessarily are meant to express differential levels of severity or brutality.
However, one main difference in the qal and piel of the verb QATSATS is not brutality but plurality. That is to say the qal is found primarily with singular objects, while the piel is most often found with plural objects or where objects are cut into many pieces.
This could be an instance of what is called the “frequentative” use of the piel in Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), pp. 414-415, where it is stated that “the Piel reflects a multiplicity of actions or objects.”
In the examples Copan cites (Jeremiah 9:26, 25:23, and 49:32) all the objects of the qal passive participle (nominal form) of QATSATS are grammatically SINGULAR, and may be literally translated “ones cut of forehead” as in Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew. The qal is fine there.
And if you cut off ONE hand, then the qal is perfectly fine. Note that Clines’ Dictionary of Classical Hebrew includes “cut off, cut away” for the qal meaning, and mentions Deuteronomy 25:12 specifically.
Consider another verb, KARAT, meaning “to cut.” It is used in the qal form when clear cutting of the flesh is indicated by circumcision in Exodus 4:25: “Then Zippo'rah took a flint and cut off [qal form of KARAT] her son's foreskin, and touched Moses’ feet with it, and said, ‘Surely you are a bridegroom of blood to me!’” ---Note Hebrew וַתִּכְרֹת֙ אֶת־ עָרְלַ֣ת בְּנָ֔הּ.
So there is nothing linguistically that prevents a qal verbal form from expressing a brutal action like cutting a hand in Deuteronomy 25:12.
REASON 6: “In this particular case, we’re talking about the open concave region of the groin, and thus a shaving of pubic hair. In short, the woman’s punishment is public humiliation for publicly humiliating a man.”
This is a manufactured inference because Copan has not shown that KAPH means the groin region (see Reason 2). Copan makes much of the fact that KAPH can carry the idea of concave features, which would apply to the groin. However, the same may be said of the palms of the hand, and so that ends up being no reason to dismiss the plain meaning of Deut. 25:12.
PART II: REASONS FOR A LITERAL UNDERSTANDING
In attempting to understand what words meant in an ancient culture, I usually begin with these sources:
A. Translations of those words by Hebrew speakers closest to the time of the earliest biblical texts, though caution must also be applied, of course;
B. Comparative Examples;
C. Context.
Applying these methods, they all lead to the conclusion that a literal understanding is the most reasonable.
A. TRANSLATIONS
First, Copan completely ignored the Septuagint, the complex of Greek translations made by those who understood Hebrew in the pre-Christian era. They understood Deut. 25:11-12 to mean “cut off her hand” not shaving of the groin. Note the passage:
11 ἐὰν δὲ μάχωνται ἄνθρωποι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό ἄνθρωπος μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ προσέλθῃ γυνὴ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς ἐκ χειρὸς τοῦ τύπτοντος αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα ἐπιλάβηται τῶν διδύμων αὐτοῦ 12 ἀποκόψεις τὴν χεῖρα αὐτῆς οὐ φείσεται ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἐπ' αὐτῇ
Note that the passage translates KAPH with the Greek CHEIRA (χεῖρα), which is the normal word for hand. It uses ἀποκόψεις, a form of APOKOPTO, which is not normally used for cutting pubic hair, but is used for chopping and mutilating. Liddell and Scott (Greek-English Lexicon, p. 100), render it “to cut off, hew off, of men’s limbs.”
There is no indication of shaving hair or groin areas, for which there were different Greek words.
The Aramaic translators of Deuteronomy 25:12 use the words “ydh” (“her hand”) and so also understand that a hand is being cut, not hair on a groin.
See: A. Sperber, The Bible in Aramaic according to the Targum Onkelos (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), vol. 1, p. 332.
B. COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES
Comparisons are important in legal materials because we have close verbal or situational parallels to the Bible in Near Eastern law codes.
We have a very close parallel, even by Copan’s admission, in the Middle Assyrian Laws A 8 (aka MAL A 8). Here is the passage (Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997] pp. 156-7):
“If a woman should crush a man’s testicle during a quarrel, they shall cut off one of her fingers...or if she should crush the second testicle during the quarrel—they shall gouge out both her [...]-s.”
Presumably, the end of the incomplete text can be reconstructed as “they shall gouge out both her eyes.”
Since both Matthew Flannagan and Copan have appealed before to Raymond Westbrook for supposed support perhaps they should also acknowledge what the latter says about Deuteronomy 25:12 in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel (p. 80):
“Deuteronomy 25:11-12 punishes a woman who seizes a man’s genitals with the loss of her hand, even though it was done to defend her husband in a fight. It is not stated whether she caused the injury or not. The law evidently derives from a case also found in MAL A 8, where the injury inflicted is the main issue.”
Copan says that this Middle Assyrian law “presents a similar scenario (in the case of injury to the man)...” to that of Deuteronomy 25. But for Copan, Deuteronomy 25, still stands “out in marked contrast to the severe and excessive mutilation punishments common in the Near East” (Is God A Moral Monster? p. 122).
At once, one sees Copan’s double standards in both moral evaluation and interpretation. One could just as easily use similar linguistic gymnastics to argue that the woman of the Middle Assyrian Laws only suffered a shaved groin.
But he evaluates Middle Assyrian laws as more brutal only because he takes them literally. On the other hand, he evaluates Deuteronomy 25 as less brutal because he takes similar words and scenarios non-literally.
Notice also that his Reason 4 used the existence of a shaving ritual in Mesopotamia to support his interpretation of Deuteronomy 25, but he won’t use a closer Middle Assyrian law to explain Deuteronomy 25.
Yet, as Westbrook notes, one can see that Deuteronomy 25 is simply a variant of that Middle Assyrian Laws. Specifically both laws:
A. Have a woman, who
B. helps her husband in a quarrel with another man
C. by injuring or seizing the testicles of her husband’s opponent,
D. and the penalty for which is mutilation of all or part of her hand.
Thus, it is unreasonable to go to texts in which the meaning of KAPH may or may not be the groin, or the hollow of the thigh, etc. when there is a text with much closer situational and legal expressions.
A good old fashioned rule in hermeneutics is to explain the more obscure text by the clearer text. The Middle Assyrian laws are much clearer in their legal parallel to Deut. 25 than Genesis 32 or Songs 5.
C. CONTEXT
Repeatedly, both Copan and Walsh tell us that one reason for a non-literal interpretation is to resolve the seeming brutality of the law in Deuteronomy 25. Jerome T. Walsh, says that his non-literal understanding “resolves the anomaly of one and only one law in the entire Israelite corpus that imposes physical mutilation as a punishment” (A Reexamination,” p. 47).
Copan says:
“Again even if Deuteronomy were dealing with an actual mutilation punishment, this would be (1) the only such mutilation punishment in the Mosaic Law and (2) a dramatic contrast to the frequent mutilation punishments in the rest of the ancient Near East.”
The first problem is philosophical. There seems to be a premise that a law that occurs only once cannot be meant literally or needs to be explained alternatively. The problem is that this is not being done consistently. There are many laws stated only once or which may have something unique, and I see no similar efforts to explain them non-literally.
For example, the only one of the Ten Commandments to have a promise is the one about honoring father and mother (Exodus 20:12). So would that mean that we should try to explain that commandment non-literally because it has some unique feature (cf. Ephesians 6:2)?
Furthermore if eliminating the only instance of X is the motive, then they only created another problem—A unique instance of Y. That is to say, Copan and Walsh now created the only instance where the verb QATSATS + the noun KAPH = “shaving pubic hair” in the Bible. Thus, they are just substituting one unique feature for another.
The second problem is that it is not quite true that Deut. 25:11-12 would be the ONLY mutilation punishment in the Mosaic Law. For that to be true, we would have to not count all the “eye-for-eye” laws in Leviticus 24:17-22 as not consisting of “mutilation.” Stoning, burning, hacking are all methods of punishing found in Pentateuchal laws and narratives, and so why should cutting off a hand be so different?
We also know that mutilation was routinely used, without censure from the narrators, in many instances. For example:
2 Samuel 4:12: “And David commanded his young men, and they killed them, and cut off their hands and feet, and hanged them beside the pool at Hebron.”
Judges 1:5-7: “They came upon Ado'ni-be'zek at Bezek, and fought against him, and defeated the Canaanites and the Per'izzites. Ado'ni-be'zek fled; but they pursued him, and caught him, and cut off his thumbs and his great toes. And Ado'ni-be'zek said, ‘Seventy kings with their thumbs and their great toes cut off used to pick up scraps under my table; as I have done, so God has requited me.’ And they brought him to Jerusalem, and he died there.”
There seems to have been no compunction about mutilating people who are perceived as offensive, and so why should Deuteronomy 25 be different?
CONCLUSION
It is easy to see why the vast majority of scholars have rejected Copan’s reading of Deuteronomy 25. That in itself does not make Copan wrong.
But since he and Matt Flannagan have appealed to Raymond Westbrook and A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, it should be reiterated that both sources specifically reject Copan’s view of Deuteronomy 25:11-12.
Copan’s view of Deuteronomy 25 is wrong because it is clearly intended to whitewash biblical brutality on the basis of the flimsiest of comparative legal and linguistic evidence and because it relies on exegetical maneuvers that could be used to explain away brutality in other Near Eastern texts Copan says are worse.
It is philosophically flawed because it is premised on the idea that uniqueness should be explained non-literally, and because it is not really unique in the first place in terms of a cultural context where bodily mutilation was practiced by the most beloved and heroic of their figures.
QUESTIONS FOR DR. COPAN
In case Dr. Copan wishes to respond, here are a few questions for him:
A. Why did you ignore the evidence of the Septuagint in your attempt to understand the meaning of Deut. 25:11-12?
B. Can you show us another clear instance where QATSATS + KAPH means “shaving pubic hair”?
C. Do you regard uniqueness of law as a reason to interpret it non-literally?
D.Where else do you find the expression "your eye shall not have pity" when someone endures punitive shaving?
E. Would you accept non-literal interpretations of the Near Eastern texts you regard as more brutal than the Bible?
NOTE: All translation are from the Revised Standard Version unless noted otherwise.
FURTHER READING:
Raymond Westbrook and Bruce Wells, Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2009).
Marc Cortez, “The Law of Violent Intervention: Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” Revisited,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 30, no. 3 (2006):431-447. Dr. Copan hastily dismisses this article.
Saul Olyan, “What do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts?” Journal of Biblical Literature 117, no. 4 (1998):611-622.
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Why Dr. Flannagan is still Wrong
The recent issue raised by Dr. Flannagan’s use of Raymond Westbrook’s work illustrates how the lack of proper reading and training in biblical studies can affect the claims made by some of the seemingly better educated Christian apologists. Let me briefly summarize the problem, and then explain why Dr. Flannagan misread Westbrook, and why I charged him with careless scholarship.
See: FlannaganReview
The initial core issue is this claim by Paul Copan: “Our interlocutor might ask: What about Scripture's emphasis on lex talionis-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Is this not a brutal retribution? First, an investigation of the Pentateuch's lex talionis texts (Exod. 21:23-5; Lev. 24:17-22; Deut. 19:16-21) reveals that, except for capital punishment ("life for life"), these are not taken literally. None of the examples illustrating "an eye for an eye" calls for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation.”
Copan's comments about the passage can be foundhere.
First, note the absolute nature of the claim made by Copan concerning texts that require lex talionis (eye-for-an-eye types of laws). He uses words such as “NONE” and “except for capital punishment, THESE ARE NOT TAKEN LITERALLY” [My capitalized emphasis].
Second, Copan includes these specific texts as ones “not taken literally”:
A. Exodus 21:23-5,
B. Leviticus 24:17-22
C. Deuteronomy 19:16-31
Alternatively, Copan’s view can be rephrased as claiming that these texts are NEVER taken literally, but refer specifically to monetary punishments.
Dr. Flannagan comes along and claims that: “In fact, Westbrook has defended Copan’s position on the lex talionis [“The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74].”
To claim that Westbrook defends Copan's position, Dr. Flannagan would have to find a quote where Westbrook indicates that NONE of the texts above are taken literally. Or Flannagan would have to find a quote from Westbrook where the latter states that these texts are NEVER taken literally.
So, it is not enough for Flannagan to find quotes where Westbrook says that these texts are SOMETIMES taken literally because SOMETIMES is contradictory to NEVER.
Note that, on his MandM website, the most he can supply are quotes from Westbrook that say that SOMETIMES these are monetary punishments, but that is not the same as NEVER literal, and not the same as ALWAYS monetary.
For me to falsify Dr. Flannagan’s claims, I just have to find ONE instance where Westbrook says that these texts are taken literally because NEVER = ZERO instances of a literal interpretation, and so finding even ONE instance of a literal interpretation is already to be more than ZERO.
I have presented a few instances now where Westbrook does say that Leviticus 24:17-22 was taken literally. I presented a quote from Westbrook’s Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law that ended with this conclusion for Leviticus 24:17-22: “We have explained this passage as an interpretation of the Exodus formula to show that 'pay a life,' meaning a fixed sum refers only to animal life; where human beings are concerned, paying a life or a limb, etc., MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION.”
This is now more than sufficient to falsify Dr. Flannagan’s claim that Westbrook supports Copan’s position. This is sufficient for me to claim that Flannagan has misrepresented Westbrook’s position.
But Dr. Flannagan also refers to Raymond Westbrook’s article, “Lex Talionis and Exodus 21, 22-25,” Revue biblique 93 (1986):52-69.
However, that article essentially repeats Westbrook’s conclusion found in Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law for Leviticus 24:17-22. So, we can now list at least three different places where Westbrook says the same thing about Leviticus 24:17-22:
A. “Lex Talionis and Exodus 21, 22-25," (Revue biblique, 1986), p. 68: “The law unambiguously demands literal retaliation, using the same terminology as in Ex. 21,23ff.”
B. Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (1988), p. 81: “We have explained this passage as an interpretation of the Exodus formula to show that 'pay a life,' meaning a fixed sum refers only to animal life; where human beings are concerned, paying a life or a limb, etc., MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION.” [My capitalized emphasis]
C. Everyday Law in Biblical Israel (2009), p. 79: “The introduction to the formula in Leviticus 24:19 is unequivocal: ‘If anyone maims a fellow, as he had done so shall it be done to him.’”
What Flannagan does not seem to understand is that Westbrook DOES NOT believe the same thing about Exodus 21:22-25. That is because Westbrook thinks that this text deals with an instance where the person who committed the injury is not known. Westbrook further explains in his Revue biblique article that the same DOES NOT apply to Leviticus 24:17-22, one of the texts that Copan said was not taken literally.
Indeed, Westbrook has been consistent since at least since 1986 in saying Leviticus 24:17-22 “MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION” [My capitalized emphasis].
How much clearer does Dr. Flannagan want Westbrook to be?
Dr. Flannagan also gives us a good reason for why he does not know what Westbrook believes because Flannagan confessed the following concerning that article in Revue biblique: “Now I have not been able to trace the original so I have left it an open possibility that everyone I read is mistaken and Avalos is correct. But I severely doubt it.”
Dr. Flannagan is essentially admitting that he made a sweeping claim that Westbrook agreed with Copan, but Flannagan:
1. Had not really read Westbrook’s article in Revue biblique;
2. Cannot tell you for sure what is on p. 74 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, in which he says Westbrook supports Copan.
3. Often relies on SECONDARY sources (e.g., Joe Sprinkle) to inform himself of what Westbrook thinks instead of reading Westbrook directly.
CONCLUSION
I believe that I have presented more than enough evidence to show that Dr. Flannagan:
A. Misrepresents Westbrook’s view because Westbrook does not agree with Copan, who claims that NONE of the biblical texts in question were taken literally.
B. Manifests careless scholarship because he did not base his conclusions on a direct reading of all the relevant works by Westbrook.
C. Manifests careless reading because he continues to insist, for example, that the view expressed concerning Leviticus 24:17-22 in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel does not belong to Westbrook despite the fact that Westbrook has said the same thing since at least 1986.
You can judge for yourselves if this constitutes careless or well-informed scholarship.
The recent issue raised by Dr. Flannagan’s use of Raymond Westbrook’s work illustrates how the lack of proper reading and training in biblical studies can affect the claims made by some of the seemingly better educated Christian apologists. Let me briefly summarize the problem, and then explain why Dr. Flannagan misread Westbrook, and why I charged him with careless scholarship.
See: FlannaganReview
The initial core issue is this claim by Paul Copan: “Our interlocutor might ask: What about Scripture's emphasis on lex talionis-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Is this not a brutal retribution? First, an investigation of the Pentateuch's lex talionis texts (Exod. 21:23-5; Lev. 24:17-22; Deut. 19:16-21) reveals that, except for capital punishment ("life for life"), these are not taken literally. None of the examples illustrating "an eye for an eye" calls for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation.”
Copan's comments about the passage can be foundhere.
First, note the absolute nature of the claim made by Copan concerning texts that require lex talionis (eye-for-an-eye types of laws). He uses words such as “NONE” and “except for capital punishment, THESE ARE NOT TAKEN LITERALLY” [My capitalized emphasis].
Second, Copan includes these specific texts as ones “not taken literally”:
A. Exodus 21:23-5,
B. Leviticus 24:17-22
C. Deuteronomy 19:16-31
Alternatively, Copan’s view can be rephrased as claiming that these texts are NEVER taken literally, but refer specifically to monetary punishments.
Dr. Flannagan comes along and claims that: “In fact, Westbrook has defended Copan’s position on the lex talionis [“The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74].”
To claim that Westbrook defends Copan's position, Dr. Flannagan would have to find a quote where Westbrook indicates that NONE of the texts above are taken literally. Or Flannagan would have to find a quote from Westbrook where the latter states that these texts are NEVER taken literally.
So, it is not enough for Flannagan to find quotes where Westbrook says that these texts are SOMETIMES taken literally because SOMETIMES is contradictory to NEVER.
Note that, on his MandM website, the most he can supply are quotes from Westbrook that say that SOMETIMES these are monetary punishments, but that is not the same as NEVER literal, and not the same as ALWAYS monetary.
For me to falsify Dr. Flannagan’s claims, I just have to find ONE instance where Westbrook says that these texts are taken literally because NEVER = ZERO instances of a literal interpretation, and so finding even ONE instance of a literal interpretation is already to be more than ZERO.
I have presented a few instances now where Westbrook does say that Leviticus 24:17-22 was taken literally. I presented a quote from Westbrook’s Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law that ended with this conclusion for Leviticus 24:17-22: “We have explained this passage as an interpretation of the Exodus formula to show that 'pay a life,' meaning a fixed sum refers only to animal life; where human beings are concerned, paying a life or a limb, etc., MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION.”
This is now more than sufficient to falsify Dr. Flannagan’s claim that Westbrook supports Copan’s position. This is sufficient for me to claim that Flannagan has misrepresented Westbrook’s position.
But Dr. Flannagan also refers to Raymond Westbrook’s article, “Lex Talionis and Exodus 21, 22-25,” Revue biblique 93 (1986):52-69.
However, that article essentially repeats Westbrook’s conclusion found in Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law for Leviticus 24:17-22. So, we can now list at least three different places where Westbrook says the same thing about Leviticus 24:17-22:
A. “Lex Talionis and Exodus 21, 22-25," (Revue biblique, 1986), p. 68: “The law unambiguously demands literal retaliation, using the same terminology as in Ex. 21,23ff.”
B. Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (1988), p. 81: “We have explained this passage as an interpretation of the Exodus formula to show that 'pay a life,' meaning a fixed sum refers only to animal life; where human beings are concerned, paying a life or a limb, etc., MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION.” [My capitalized emphasis]
C. Everyday Law in Biblical Israel (2009), p. 79: “The introduction to the formula in Leviticus 24:19 is unequivocal: ‘If anyone maims a fellow, as he had done so shall it be done to him.’”
What Flannagan does not seem to understand is that Westbrook DOES NOT believe the same thing about Exodus 21:22-25. That is because Westbrook thinks that this text deals with an instance where the person who committed the injury is not known. Westbrook further explains in his Revue biblique article that the same DOES NOT apply to Leviticus 24:17-22, one of the texts that Copan said was not taken literally.
Indeed, Westbrook has been consistent since at least since 1986 in saying Leviticus 24:17-22 “MEANS LITERAL RETALIATION” [My capitalized emphasis].
How much clearer does Dr. Flannagan want Westbrook to be?
Dr. Flannagan also gives us a good reason for why he does not know what Westbrook believes because Flannagan confessed the following concerning that article in Revue biblique: “Now I have not been able to trace the original so I have left it an open possibility that everyone I read is mistaken and Avalos is correct. But I severely doubt it.”
Dr. Flannagan is essentially admitting that he made a sweeping claim that Westbrook agreed with Copan, but Flannagan:
1. Had not really read Westbrook’s article in Revue biblique;
2. Cannot tell you for sure what is on p. 74 of A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, in which he says Westbrook supports Copan.
3. Often relies on SECONDARY sources (e.g., Joe Sprinkle) to inform himself of what Westbrook thinks instead of reading Westbrook directly.
CONCLUSION
I believe that I have presented more than enough evidence to show that Dr. Flannagan:
A. Misrepresents Westbrook’s view because Westbrook does not agree with Copan, who claims that NONE of the biblical texts in question were taken literally.
B. Manifests careless scholarship because he did not base his conclusions on a direct reading of all the relevant works by Westbrook.
C. Manifests careless reading because he continues to insist, for example, that the view expressed concerning Leviticus 24:17-22 in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel does not belong to Westbrook despite the fact that Westbrook has said the same thing since at least 1986.
You can judge for yourselves if this constitutes careless or well-informed scholarship.
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Dr. Flannagan's use of sources shows some careless scholarship.
Dr. Matt Flannagan, of the MandM blog, has directed a few criticism at my chapters (“Yahweh is A Moral Monster” and “Atheism was not the Cause of the Holocaust”) in The Christian Delusion. Those criticisms rest not only on a basic misunderstanding and misreading of my arguments, but also on a very selective and uncritical reading of the sources Flannagan cites for support.
See: FlannaganReview
FLANNAGAN MISREPRESENTS WESTBROOK
In my chapter, “Yahweh is a Moral Monster,” I critiqued Paul’s Copan claim that lex talionis in the Bible represented a moral advance compared to other Near Eastern cultures. I countered that Copan was using the word “advancement” arbitrarily because:
A. If lex talionis represents an advancement, then we already found it in pre-biblical laws (e.g., Code of Hammurabi);
B. If replacing lex talionis with fines or sacrifices was an advancement, then the Hittite Code had done that prior to biblical law.
Within the scope of that argument I addressed the following claim by Copan that it was a biblical advance to eliminate legal punitive mutilation:
“Our interlocutor might ask: What about Scripture's emphasis on lex talionis-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Is this not a brutal retribution? First, an investigation of the Pentateuch's lex talionis texts (Exod. 21:23-5; Lev. 24:17-22; Deut. 19:16-21) reveals that, except for capital punishment ("life for life"), these are not taken literally. None of the examples illustrating "an eye for an eye" calls for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation.”
I contend that Copan provides no sound evidence for his claim that none of the biblical laws he cited (except life for life) were taken literally or don’t call for bodily mutilation, but rather demand just monetary compensation.
According to Flannagan, Raymond Westbrook, the Near Eastern legal expert whom I cited in connection with another argument, agrees with Copan. Flannagan states:
In fact, Westbrook has defended Copan’s position on the lex talionis [“The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74].”
First, Flannagan offers no actual quote to support this allegation so that we can verify whether he is even reading Westbrook correctly.
Westbrook has made himself quite clear in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2009], pp. 78-79). Therein he discusses how later Rabbinic literature, and specifically Mekhiltah Neziqin 8 to Exodus 21:24, claimed that “An eye for an eye’ [means] money.”
Westbrook comments: “This interpretation seems strained to a modern reader. The introduction to the formula in Leviticus 24:19 is unequivocal: "If anyone maims a fellow, as he had done so shall it be done to him.”
Westbrook does argue that instances of replacing lex talionis with monetary fines in later rabbinic literature may have had some historical precedent, but that is because Westbrook is citing as precedents some of the Near Eastern laws that Copan treats as inferior.
In any case, Westbrook is not arguing that the biblical laws of lex talionis NEVER were taken literally, which is the claim from Copan that I was addressing (with the exception of life for a life).
FLANNAGAN ON JESUS AND DAUBE
In countering Copan’s claim that biblical laws of lex talionis were never taken literally, I cited the words of Jesus in Matthew 5:38-39 (RSV): “[38]You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ [39] But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.”
I argued that Jesus seems to take lex talionis literally, as it makes little sense to interpret that passage to mean that Jesus was just doing away with monetary fines.
Flannagan responded: “Further, Avalos contends that Jesus took the lex talionis literally in Matt 5:38-39, a position refuted by David Daube [The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 256].”
This is mere assertion on the part of Flannagan, and represents a completely uncritical and selective reading of Daube. Daube does, in fact, argue that lex talionis in Jewish law at the time of Jesus meant monetary compensation.
However, Flannagan never critically evaluates the primary sources that Daube cites for support. Note this statement by Daube (p. 256):
“Not a single instance of the practice of retaliation is mentioned in the sources. Both Mishna and Mekhilta reject any literal interpretation of an ‘Eye for an eye’ and lay down that the wrongdoer has to pay damages.”
But both the Mishna and Mekhilta date some two hundred years or more after Jesus, and so do not provide definitive evidence for the practices at the time of Jesus. Flannagan is particularly oblivious to his own criticism (addressed below) that I cited Innocent III to support a practice that occurred 112 years earlier.
Moreover, Flannagan does not tell readers that Daube retreats from his statement that “not a single instance...is mentioned in the sources.”
Yes, Daube himself cites the fact that there were contrary opinions given in rabbinic sources, and Daube mentions specifically that “[a] group of Sadducees, the Boethusaeans, seem to have been in favor of actual retaliation and their attitude was shared by at least one Talmudic authority, Rabbi Eliezer.”
What Daube tells us next is sheer speculation: “It is, however, doubtful whether this doctrine represents a genuine survival of ancient legal ideas; it may well have been a revival due to the Sadducean theory that the Bible ought to be interpreted quite literally...”
But Daube provides no evidence to decide whether it is a “survival” or a “revival.” He merely speculates here. Moreover, even a “revival” would contradict Copan’s view that those laws were NEVER taken literally.
Flannagan also does not mention that Daube knows that Josephus, who is a source dated to the first century, seems to understand Exodus 21:24 and Leviticus 24:19 as allowing actual bodily mutilation. Note Josephus’ own words:
“He that maimeth a man shall undergo the like, being deprived of that limb whereof he deprived the other, unless indeed the maimed man be willing to accept money” (Antiquities 4.280; Loeb Classical Series).
Daube offers no reason for dismissing this as a Jewish understanding of Exodus in the first century, except that he thinks Josephus has been influenced the Roman laws known as the Twelve Tables.
But, as Daube himself notes, these laws were out of date by the time of Josephus. Daube can only speculate that, as a lawyer, Josephus might have known them. Given Josephus' wording, it is possible. But even if there were influence from the Twelve Tables, it shows that Josephus thought biblical law allowed mutilation.
Otherwise, Daube’s dismissal of Josephus as evidence for Jewish law in the first century is circular:
A. Josephus does not represent Jewish Law in the first century because
B. The main representation of Jewish Law is later Rabbinic literature;
C. Later Rabbinic literature represents Jewish Law in the first century because Josephus does not represent Jewish Law in the first century.
In any case, there is sufficient evidence to refute the contention that lex talionis was never understood literally, even at the time of Jesus. Flannagan simply fails to give readers any critical evaluation of the sources, and fails to mention that Daube does not necessarily support Copan’s view that the Pentateuchal laws were never interpreted literally BEFORE Jesus.
As it is, Flannagan might need to update his Copan readings. On page 121 of Is God A Moral Monster: Making Sense of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011), Copan reluctantly admits that Deuteronomy 25:11-12 might be “the only biblical instance of punishment by mutilation.”
In that case a woman’s hand is to be cut off not because she cut someone else’s hand, but because she seized the testicles of a man fighting with her husband in order to save her husband.
So now Copan has gone from arguing that the Bible represented an advance over other cultures that practiced legal mutilation to making a case for the Bible’s superiority because it might have ONLY ONE case of mutilation for a poor woman helping to save her husband. What a magnificent improvement.
FLANNAGAN ON INNOCENT III
In explaining the Christian roots of the Nazi Holocaust, I provided the example of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1096 to show that such actions by Christian laypersons did not need Darwinism as a motive. I explained that the motive could have been provided by the anti-Jewish papal rhetoric that was pervasive in Medieval times. Here is how I phrased it:
“On the other hand, the laity may have acted the way they did because of words such as those of Pope Innocent III, who on October 9, 1208, issued the following announcement concerning heretics and Jews to Philip II Augustus, the king of France: ‘In order that the Holy Church of God, arrayed like a fearful battlefront, may proceed against its cruelest enemies, to exterminate [ad exterminandum] the followers of wicked heresy, which like a serpent or an ulcer, has infected the entire province, we have caused garrisons of Christian soldiers to be called together . .’ Notice that, even if not always carried out literally, the idea of exterminating groups of people (heretics, Jews) is already there, as is the use of medicalized genocidal language ('ulcer . . . infected') also common to Nazism.”
Flannagan thinks I somehow misread my own chronology because he interprets me as saying that the laypeople of 1096 were directly influenced by a papal pronouncement in 1208, given 112 years later. He calls this a “howler.”
Apparently, Flannagan, in a hasty attempt to score some points, interprets the phrase “words SUCH AS THOSE of Pope Innocent III” to mean the same as “the words of Pope Innocent III.”
The fact that I cited the dates plainly suggests that I don’t mean the latter. Rather, I was speaking more generally of the effects of Medieval papal views on the Jews, of which Innocent III was one example. I also cited Innocent III to draw a moral equivalent to views of the Nazis. If Flannagan had read more carefully and was not selective in his quotations of my chapter, he might have noted what I said on p. 380:
“Otherwise, D’Souza would have to explain why Pope Innocent III was right to say God wanted him to exterminate Jews or heretics in the Middle Ages, but God would not have wanted the same thing for Hitler in the twentieth century.”
Besides, I am not sure why Flannagan, who thinks later rabbinic literature can represent views found hundreds of years earlier, would prohibit the views of Innocent III from existing 112 years earlier.
FLANNAGAN AND DARWIN
My chapter on the Holocaust explained how the anti-Judaism of Nazi Christianity can be traced back all the way to the New Testament. Thus, we don’t need Darwinism to explain that anti-Judaism.
But Flannagan takes me to mean that somehow I accept later and distorted interpretations of Christianity (such as those of the Nazis) as a form of Christianity, but I don’t accept later and distorted interpretations of Darwin as instances of Darwinism.
Actually, he has my argument a bit backward. My argument is that the anti-Judaism in Nazism is NOT some later distorted version of Christianity, but rather goes back to Jesus himself, as portrayed in John 8:44 among other places. I note specifically (p. 378 of The Christian Delusion) that this verse was posted on Nazi road signs, while none of Darwin’s words were ever used that way.
There is no equivalent passage from Darwin that I am alleging the Nazis are distorting or misinterpreting to be the words of Darwin, and so I am not sure why Flannagan even draws this analogy in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Flannagan’s criticisms of my chapters do not withstand scrutiny once one actually reads the sources he cites. As it is, he does not provide exact quotes from Westbrook or Daube that would allow us to evaluate how accurately he is representing his sources.
Flannagan’s criticisms, for the most part, focused on specific items that did not refute the larger theses I put forth: 1) Copan’s claims about biblical advances are faulty or misleading, and 2) We don’t need Darwinism to explain the holocaust because many of the major features of Nazi anti-Judaism can be found before Darwin in Christian theology and history, starting with the New Testament.
I hope Dr. Flannagan can do more homework and present a more cogent challenge the next time he decides to write a critique at a professional level.
QUESTIONS FOR DR. FLANNAGAN
1. Where does Westbrook say that the biblical laws of lex talionis in the Pentateuch were never taken literally? If so, what was his evidence?
2. Do you regard Josephus as a witness to Jewish law in the first century?
3. How did Daube decide what was a survival versus a revival in rabbinic law of lex talionis at the time of Jesus?
4. Do you deem it an ethical advance to cut off a woman’s hand for seizing the testicles of her husband’s opponent? If so, why?
Dr. Matt Flannagan, of the MandM blog, has directed a few criticism at my chapters (“Yahweh is A Moral Monster” and “Atheism was not the Cause of the Holocaust”) in The Christian Delusion. Those criticisms rest not only on a basic misunderstanding and misreading of my arguments, but also on a very selective and uncritical reading of the sources Flannagan cites for support.
See: FlannaganReview
FLANNAGAN MISREPRESENTS WESTBROOK
In my chapter, “Yahweh is a Moral Monster,” I critiqued Paul’s Copan claim that lex talionis in the Bible represented a moral advance compared to other Near Eastern cultures. I countered that Copan was using the word “advancement” arbitrarily because:
A. If lex talionis represents an advancement, then we already found it in pre-biblical laws (e.g., Code of Hammurabi);
B. If replacing lex talionis with fines or sacrifices was an advancement, then the Hittite Code had done that prior to biblical law.
Within the scope of that argument I addressed the following claim by Copan that it was a biblical advance to eliminate legal punitive mutilation:
“Our interlocutor might ask: What about Scripture's emphasis on lex talionis-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Is this not a brutal retribution? First, an investigation of the Pentateuch's lex talionis texts (Exod. 21:23-5; Lev. 24:17-22; Deut. 19:16-21) reveals that, except for capital punishment ("life for life"), these are not taken literally. None of the examples illustrating "an eye for an eye" calls for bodily mutilation, but rather just (monetary) compensation.”
I contend that Copan provides no sound evidence for his claim that none of the biblical laws he cited (except life for life) were taken literally or don’t call for bodily mutilation, but rather demand just monetary compensation.
According to Flannagan, Raymond Westbrook, the Near Eastern legal expert whom I cited in connection with another argument, agrees with Copan. Flannagan states:
In fact, Westbrook has defended Copan’s position on the lex talionis [“The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74].”
First, Flannagan offers no actual quote to support this allegation so that we can verify whether he is even reading Westbrook correctly.
Westbrook has made himself quite clear in Everyday Law in Biblical Israel: An Introduction [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2009], pp. 78-79). Therein he discusses how later Rabbinic literature, and specifically Mekhiltah Neziqin 8 to Exodus 21:24, claimed that “An eye for an eye’ [means] money.”
Westbrook comments: “This interpretation seems strained to a modern reader. The introduction to the formula in Leviticus 24:19 is unequivocal: "If anyone maims a fellow, as he had done so shall it be done to him.”
Westbrook does argue that instances of replacing lex talionis with monetary fines in later rabbinic literature may have had some historical precedent, but that is because Westbrook is citing as precedents some of the Near Eastern laws that Copan treats as inferior.
In any case, Westbrook is not arguing that the biblical laws of lex talionis NEVER were taken literally, which is the claim from Copan that I was addressing (with the exception of life for a life).
FLANNAGAN ON JESUS AND DAUBE
In countering Copan’s claim that biblical laws of lex talionis were never taken literally, I cited the words of Jesus in Matthew 5:38-39 (RSV): “[38]You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ [39] But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.”
I argued that Jesus seems to take lex talionis literally, as it makes little sense to interpret that passage to mean that Jesus was just doing away with monetary fines.
Flannagan responded: “Further, Avalos contends that Jesus took the lex talionis literally in Matt 5:38-39, a position refuted by David Daube [The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 256].”
This is mere assertion on the part of Flannagan, and represents a completely uncritical and selective reading of Daube. Daube does, in fact, argue that lex talionis in Jewish law at the time of Jesus meant monetary compensation.
However, Flannagan never critically evaluates the primary sources that Daube cites for support. Note this statement by Daube (p. 256):
“Not a single instance of the practice of retaliation is mentioned in the sources. Both Mishna and Mekhilta reject any literal interpretation of an ‘Eye for an eye’ and lay down that the wrongdoer has to pay damages.”
But both the Mishna and Mekhilta date some two hundred years or more after Jesus, and so do not provide definitive evidence for the practices at the time of Jesus. Flannagan is particularly oblivious to his own criticism (addressed below) that I cited Innocent III to support a practice that occurred 112 years earlier.
Moreover, Flannagan does not tell readers that Daube retreats from his statement that “not a single instance...is mentioned in the sources.”
Yes, Daube himself cites the fact that there were contrary opinions given in rabbinic sources, and Daube mentions specifically that “[a] group of Sadducees, the Boethusaeans, seem to have been in favor of actual retaliation and their attitude was shared by at least one Talmudic authority, Rabbi Eliezer.”
What Daube tells us next is sheer speculation: “It is, however, doubtful whether this doctrine represents a genuine survival of ancient legal ideas; it may well have been a revival due to the Sadducean theory that the Bible ought to be interpreted quite literally...”
But Daube provides no evidence to decide whether it is a “survival” or a “revival.” He merely speculates here. Moreover, even a “revival” would contradict Copan’s view that those laws were NEVER taken literally.
Flannagan also does not mention that Daube knows that Josephus, who is a source dated to the first century, seems to understand Exodus 21:24 and Leviticus 24:19 as allowing actual bodily mutilation. Note Josephus’ own words:
“He that maimeth a man shall undergo the like, being deprived of that limb whereof he deprived the other, unless indeed the maimed man be willing to accept money” (Antiquities 4.280; Loeb Classical Series).
Daube offers no reason for dismissing this as a Jewish understanding of Exodus in the first century, except that he thinks Josephus has been influenced the Roman laws known as the Twelve Tables.
But, as Daube himself notes, these laws were out of date by the time of Josephus. Daube can only speculate that, as a lawyer, Josephus might have known them. Given Josephus' wording, it is possible. But even if there were influence from the Twelve Tables, it shows that Josephus thought biblical law allowed mutilation.
Otherwise, Daube’s dismissal of Josephus as evidence for Jewish law in the first century is circular:
A. Josephus does not represent Jewish Law in the first century because
B. The main representation of Jewish Law is later Rabbinic literature;
C. Later Rabbinic literature represents Jewish Law in the first century because Josephus does not represent Jewish Law in the first century.
In any case, there is sufficient evidence to refute the contention that lex talionis was never understood literally, even at the time of Jesus. Flannagan simply fails to give readers any critical evaluation of the sources, and fails to mention that Daube does not necessarily support Copan’s view that the Pentateuchal laws were never interpreted literally BEFORE Jesus.
As it is, Flannagan might need to update his Copan readings. On page 121 of Is God A Moral Monster: Making Sense of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011), Copan reluctantly admits that Deuteronomy 25:11-12 might be “the only biblical instance of punishment by mutilation.”
In that case a woman’s hand is to be cut off not because she cut someone else’s hand, but because she seized the testicles of a man fighting with her husband in order to save her husband.
So now Copan has gone from arguing that the Bible represented an advance over other cultures that practiced legal mutilation to making a case for the Bible’s superiority because it might have ONLY ONE case of mutilation for a poor woman helping to save her husband. What a magnificent improvement.
FLANNAGAN ON INNOCENT III
In explaining the Christian roots of the Nazi Holocaust, I provided the example of the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1096 to show that such actions by Christian laypersons did not need Darwinism as a motive. I explained that the motive could have been provided by the anti-Jewish papal rhetoric that was pervasive in Medieval times. Here is how I phrased it:
“On the other hand, the laity may have acted the way they did because of words such as those of Pope Innocent III, who on October 9, 1208, issued the following announcement concerning heretics and Jews to Philip II Augustus, the king of France: ‘In order that the Holy Church of God, arrayed like a fearful battlefront, may proceed against its cruelest enemies, to exterminate [ad exterminandum] the followers of wicked heresy, which like a serpent or an ulcer, has infected the entire province, we have caused garrisons of Christian soldiers to be called together . .’ Notice that, even if not always carried out literally, the idea of exterminating groups of people (heretics, Jews) is already there, as is the use of medicalized genocidal language ('ulcer . . . infected') also common to Nazism.”
Flannagan thinks I somehow misread my own chronology because he interprets me as saying that the laypeople of 1096 were directly influenced by a papal pronouncement in 1208, given 112 years later. He calls this a “howler.”
Apparently, Flannagan, in a hasty attempt to score some points, interprets the phrase “words SUCH AS THOSE of Pope Innocent III” to mean the same as “the words of Pope Innocent III.”
The fact that I cited the dates plainly suggests that I don’t mean the latter. Rather, I was speaking more generally of the effects of Medieval papal views on the Jews, of which Innocent III was one example. I also cited Innocent III to draw a moral equivalent to views of the Nazis. If Flannagan had read more carefully and was not selective in his quotations of my chapter, he might have noted what I said on p. 380:
“Otherwise, D’Souza would have to explain why Pope Innocent III was right to say God wanted him to exterminate Jews or heretics in the Middle Ages, but God would not have wanted the same thing for Hitler in the twentieth century.”
Besides, I am not sure why Flannagan, who thinks later rabbinic literature can represent views found hundreds of years earlier, would prohibit the views of Innocent III from existing 112 years earlier.
FLANNAGAN AND DARWIN
My chapter on the Holocaust explained how the anti-Judaism of Nazi Christianity can be traced back all the way to the New Testament. Thus, we don’t need Darwinism to explain that anti-Judaism.
But Flannagan takes me to mean that somehow I accept later and distorted interpretations of Christianity (such as those of the Nazis) as a form of Christianity, but I don’t accept later and distorted interpretations of Darwin as instances of Darwinism.
Actually, he has my argument a bit backward. My argument is that the anti-Judaism in Nazism is NOT some later distorted version of Christianity, but rather goes back to Jesus himself, as portrayed in John 8:44 among other places. I note specifically (p. 378 of The Christian Delusion) that this verse was posted on Nazi road signs, while none of Darwin’s words were ever used that way.
There is no equivalent passage from Darwin that I am alleging the Nazis are distorting or misinterpreting to be the words of Darwin, and so I am not sure why Flannagan even draws this analogy in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Flannagan’s criticisms of my chapters do not withstand scrutiny once one actually reads the sources he cites. As it is, he does not provide exact quotes from Westbrook or Daube that would allow us to evaluate how accurately he is representing his sources.
Flannagan’s criticisms, for the most part, focused on specific items that did not refute the larger theses I put forth: 1) Copan’s claims about biblical advances are faulty or misleading, and 2) We don’t need Darwinism to explain the holocaust because many of the major features of Nazi anti-Judaism can be found before Darwin in Christian theology and history, starting with the New Testament.
I hope Dr. Flannagan can do more homework and present a more cogent challenge the next time he decides to write a critique at a professional level.
QUESTIONS FOR DR. FLANNAGAN
1. Where does Westbrook say that the biblical laws of lex talionis in the Pentateuch were never taken literally? If so, what was his evidence?
2. Do you regard Josephus as a witness to Jewish law in the first century?
3. How did Daube decide what was a survival versus a revival in rabbinic law of lex talionis at the time of Jesus?
4. Do you deem it an ethical advance to cut off a woman’s hand for seizing the testicles of her husband’s opponent? If so, why?
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If you admire Hector's scholarship like I do, you may want to read some of his posts/links here at DC. Just click here. When you get to the bottom of a page click on the "Older Posts" link to see some of the earlier ones. There are 29 posts (which will now include this one). Enjoy.
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